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IN TilE SUPREHE COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15687

-vsPAUL DAVID VAN DYKE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with the crime of aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§

76-6-302 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by a jury, the Honorable Dean E.

Conder, presiding.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty and

the court sentenced appellant to a term of five years to life
to run consecutively with appellant's prior sentences.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment below.
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STATEI1ENT OF FACTS
on October 8, 1977, at approximately 11:20 p.m.,
the Villa Theatre, located at 3092 Highland Drive, Salt
Lake County, was robbed by appellant, Kirt Moyes and Randy
Reid (Tr.78-81).
Appellant and Moyes entered the theatre armed with
.45 caliber pistols which were subsequently seized at
appellant's residence the same night (Tr.36,78,83,184-186).
They ordered an employee to put the theatre's cash receipts
in a laundry bag (Tr.37-39).

The laundry bag, the small

bags from the theatre which contained the cash and coins,
and a note written by the employee, were recovered that
night from Moyes' room (Tr.l82-184,40-44).
and Moyes left the

th~3tre

The appellant

and jumped into Randy Reid's

red 1977 Cutlass automobile.

Patrons of a lounge just

north of the theatre observed a man wearing a ski mask enter
a late model red car.

The patrons noted the license number

of the car as RJD 58.

A Salt Lake City police officer

observed a red Cutlass, license number RJD458 enter the
garage of appellant's residence approximately 30 minutes
later (Tr.l54).

Reid drove to another car where the money

(in the laundry bag), weapons and clothing were transferred
from Reid's car to the other (Tr.Bl-83,88).

Both cars

returned to appellant's residence (all the participants
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lived at the residence in Bountiful, although appellant
paid the rent (Tr.lll)), and arrived within minutes of
each other (Tr.84).

The weapons and money were transferred

from the car to the house and the money was counted (Tr.88).
Appellant's residence was under surveillance when
the participants returned from the theatre.

Police,

approximately five hours later, pursuant to a search
warrant issued by Justice of the Peace John A. Stewart,
searched the residence and recovered the weapons mentioned
earlier, cash, a laundry bag, and money bags from the
Villa Theatre (Tr.4,181-186,192,20l).
During trial appellant moved to suppress evidence
seized pursuant to t"he search warrant on the grounds, inter
alia, that Judge Stewart was not a law-trained judge (Tr.7).
That motion was denied (Tr.32).

Appellant also moved for

a mistrial because the testimony of two witnesses allegedly
prejudiced him (Tr.69-73,172,187-191).

The court struck

the answer of one witness and cautioned the jury concerning
the testimony (Tr.l72).

The motions for mistrial were

denied (Tr. 73,191).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED BY JUDGE STEWART WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY AND STATUTORILY VALID.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant argues that the search warrant in
this case was invalid because it was issued by a Justice
of the Peace who is not a lawyer.

This argument has

no support in statute, case law or the Constitution.
Utah Code Ann.

§

77-54-l (1953), as amended,

defines "search warrant:"
"A search warrant is an order
in writing, in the name of the
State, signed by a magistrate and
directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for
personal property and bring i t
before the magistrate." (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann.
identifies whlch

~2:c~-s

§

77-10-5 (1953), as amended,

are magistrates:

"The following persons are
magistrates:
(l) Justices of the Supreme Court.
(2) Judges of the district courts.
(3) Judges of the city courts.
(4) Justices of the peace." (Emphasis added.
Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242
(1943), construed the precursors of Sections 77-54-l and
77-10-5, Section 105-54-l,

R.s.u. 1933 and 105-10-5, R.s.u. 1'

and held that, "A justice of the peace has power to issue
search warrants."
Despite the holdiwj of Allen v. Holbro_?k, supra,
appellant contends that by analogy Utah Code Ann.

§

78-5-4

(1953), as amended, requires that only law-trained judges
issue search warrants.

This analogy is flawe~ and
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Section 78-5-4 deals specifically and narrowly
with the right to be tried by a law-trained judge
whenever a jail sentence may be imposed.

By statute,

the legislature determined that certain changes in the
jurisdiction and power of justices of the peace was
warranted. Legislation is the proper way to change the
jurisdiction and power of a magistrate.

If a change

such as appellant proposes has merit it should be
considered and enacted by the law-making body of government.

The same argument applies to appellant's reference

to Utah Code Ann.

§

77-12-l (1953), as amended, which

discusses issuance of arrest warrants.
Appellant cites Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d
207

(Utah 1976), to show that justices of the peace should

handle minor cases.

Shelmidine is instructive on other

points as well and has direct application to the present
case.
In Shelmidine, three petitioner's attacked by extraordinary writ the right of a non-lawyer justice of the peace to
proceed with their cases because there were potential
jail sentences.

A district judge issued the writ and

the defendant justice of the peace appealed.

This Court

found the writ was improperly issued and subject to
recall.

The Court noted, however, that since filing of

the writ a statute had passed requiring law-trained judges
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to hear cases involving jail sentences and

re~anded

the

cases for trial consistent with the new statute.
Justice Crockett writing for the Court observed:
"Also, it should be borne in
mind that there is a definite
distinction between a change in
interpretation or application of
a statute, which sometimes quite
justifiably occurs, and attempting
by judicial fiat to affect a
substantial change in law as clearly
expressed in a statute or the constitution. When such a substantial
change is necessary or desirable, our
constitution has set up procedures--for the change by the legislature,
or of the constitution, by the
amendment process."
(Emphasis
added.)
550 P.2d at 210.
The Court also stated:
"For the reasons stated herein
we are unable to agree with the
ruling of the district judge that
the portion of our own constitution
which vested the challenged power
in justices of the peace, is itself
unconstitutional." 550 P.2d at 211.
Following the language of Shelmidine,respondent
asserts that the issuance of search warrants by non-lawyer
justices of the peace is not unconstitutional.

The

issuance in this case was valid and consistent with
statute and authoritative case law.
Appellant points to the nighttime search provision
of the warrant in this case to support his contention that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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only a law-trained judge should issue search warrants.
Appellant correctly states the law in Utah
concerning nighttime searches and State v. Treadway,
28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972), correctly construes
the statute.

However, appellant's statement that, "The

affidavit in the instant case did not so indicate [positiveness)
(Appellant's brief, P. 6), is inaccurate.

The trial

found the warrant and supporting affidavit to be sufficiently
positive to justify denying appellant's motion to quash the
warrant (Tr.32).

There is no testimony rebutting the

positive nature of the affidavit.

The transcript reveals

that appellant's trial counsel characterized the affidavit
as insufficiently positive and the state characterized i t
as sufficiently positive.

The trial court was in the best

position to determine the validity of the warrant and its
decision should not be reversed absent a showing of abuse
of discretion.

Appellant does not claim nor show any

abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Appellant posits a general contention which seems
to be that only law-trained judges can adequately understand
and determine complex issues of law and therefore are the
only ones who should be permitted to issue search warrants.
This contention ignores the role which magistrates play in
issuing search warrants.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 407 U.S.
345 {1972), establishes two tests which magistrates
issuing warrants must meet.

They must be {1) neutral and

detached and {2) capable of determining whether probable
cause exists.

92 s.ct. at 2123.

Coury v. United States, 246 F.2d 1354 {6th Cir.
1970), stated concerning search warrants and those who
issue them:
"[O]nly a probability of
criminal conduct need be shown;
the rules for determining probable
cause are less rigorous than the
rules of evidence; the commissioner
[United States Commissioner] should be
guided by common sense, and 'great
deference' should be given to the
co!TlJl'issioner's determination of
probable cause." 426 F.2d at 1356.
(Emphasis added.)
The requirements of a warrant in Utah are found
in Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-3 {1953), as amended.

This section

repeats the probable cause and particularity standards
found in the United States Constitution.
The justice of the peace in this case satisfies the
tests of Shadwick and Coury.

The fact that Judge Stewart is

not a lawyer does not make him incapable of determining
probable cause.

Non-lawyer juries are constantly asked

to decide complex and subtle issues under a standard of
proof much more rigorous than probable cause.
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Police can make searches and arrests without
warrants under certain circumstances.

Police decisions

of this kind often involve complex factual and legal
issues and must be made immediately and under conditions
of stress.

No constitutional or statutory provision

requires that police be law-trained.
Statutes, case law and common sense indicate
that the magistrate in this case had jurisdiction to
issue a search warrant.
executed.

The warrant was valid and legally

Appellant's contention to the contrary is

without merit and does not justify reversal in this
case.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT CQ}frHT ERROR IN ADHITTING
TESTIMONY ABOUT APPELLANT.
Appellant refers to two witnesses whose testimony
constituted prejudicial error.

Respondent maintains that

neither witnesses' testimony was error and even if error,
such testimony was harmless error not justifying reversal.
The testimony of the first witness is found in
appellant's brief at pp. 7-8.

This testimony was admissible

under at least two theories.
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Under Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence
that a person committed a crime on a specified occasion is
admissible to prove absence of mistake or accident, motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity,
The testimony in this case established motive for the crime

in question and was relevant to the issues of intent,
tion and knowledge.

prepar~

See also State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d

1233 (Utah 1975).
Moreover, the general nature of testimony, "they
had been hitting a few rinky-dink places" is not evidence
of a crime committed on a specified occasion and therefore
is not within the proscription of Rule 55.
Ap~eiia~t's

testimony

fro~

counsel also elicited similar

the witness on cross-examination.

Mr. Reid

in response to counsel's question stated, "I said hitting
a bigger place possibly like the Villa."

Counsel then

said, "Oh.

Well, what did you think hitting a bigger

place

meant."

(Tr.ll6).

The use of the comparative "bigger" suggests
other smaller robberies.

Yet this testimony was given

during cross-examination and repeated by appellant's
counsel.
Any possible error, therefore, was compounded
and reiterated by appellant.

Appellant should not he
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allowed to claim error where he contributes to it.
The testimony would also be admissible as a
declaration against interest under Rule 63(10) of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.

Under that rule, statements

by a declarant who is unavailable as a witness are
admissible if they subject him to criminal liability
under circumstances which indicate the statements were
true.

Aprellant's statementstoBr. Reid are of this

nature and were therefore properly admitted.
The testimony of the second witness, appellant's
girlfriend, Maria Newman, is found at Tr. 161-179.
A reading of the complete testimony shows that
the witness made several statements about the appellant
referring, on the night of the robbery, to "going to work."
(Tr.l68,17l,l77).

The State's question at issue here and

the witness' answer could be viewed as explaining what
appellant meant and the witness understood by "going to
work."

It could also be viewed as an attempt to establish

how appellant paid cash for groceries.
Respondent submits that such testimony was
admissible.

The trial court, however, viewed it differently

and immediately struck the answer and instructed the jury
to disregard it (Tr.l72).

This action by the court cured

any possible error or prejudice which may have occurred.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant cites State v.

Gooc1_!i£~,

Utah (No.

15363, decided May 1, 1978) to support his claim that Maria
Newman's testimony was prejudicial.

Goodliffe is not like

this case and inapplicable.
In Goodliffe, a forcible sexual abuse case, the

trial court permitted testimony of three prior similar
bad acts committee by the appellant as rebuttal on the

issue of appellant's truthfulness and veracity.

This

Court noted that while the testimony was admitted on the
issue of truthfulness and veracity, "the clear implication
of the testimony was that it was an attempt to demonstrate
defendant's prope2sity to commit sexual crimes of the
nature he is

~~es~-:!y

charged with."

Following this observation the Court made the
statement quoted in appellant's brief.
Appellant cites three cases for the proposition
that a mistrial will be granted when the prosecution
intentionally elicits inadmissible testimony.

The cases

are distinguishable and provide no authority for appellant's
position.
In State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 298, 119 P.2d 112
(1941), a witness mentioned another arrest of the defendant.
The trial court struck the answer and admonished the jury
to disregard it.

This Court found no error but did suggest

in dicta that the trial court might have declared a mistrial
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if it were sh01·m that the testimony was an attempt to
introduce a prejudicial reference to another crime.
is not the case here.

Such

The dicta of Hartman is not authority

and the conduct of the prosecution has not and was not
shown or alleged to be an intentional effort to introduce
prejudicial references to other crimes.

In fact, the

challenged testimony of Mr. Reid is similar to the
unresponsive answer of the witness in Hartman.
State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 30, 282 P.2d 323
(1955), was a death penalty case.

This Court found that

the cumulative effect of several errors at trial required
reversal.

This Court noted, in dicta, that deliberate

introduction of hearsay statements, by the state, which
implied that the defendant threatened the victim on several
occasions interfered with a fair trial.

This Court further

observed, however, that the manner of eliciting the
objectionable testimony was not controlling.

282 P.2d at

330.
In State v. Case, 547 P.2d 221 (Utah 1976), this
Court in commenting on references to the defendant's former
incarceration at the Utah State Prison stated, "It does
not appear that the prosecution sought to elicit the
information," and found the denial of a motion for mistrial
to be prorer.
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The State in this case did not deliberately or
intentionally elicit inadmissible testimony.

The trial

court struck one answer and instructed the jury to
disregard it.

The other testimony was admissible under

Rules 55 and 6 3 ( 10) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

No

error occurred because of the testimony and no prejudice
resulted.

CONCLUSION
The search warrant issued in this case was
valid and evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was

properly admitted.
Testimony concerning other bad acts coi!lf'litted
by appellant was either admissible or properly excluded
by the trial ·:nnre '·."th appropriate admonition to the jury.
No prejudice resulted from such testimony and appellant's

conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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